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Abstract
We examine the profitability and social eﬃciency of horizontal
mergers in a Cournot oligopoly with decreasing average costs. As-
suming the merger allows for a reduction in the total amount of fixed
costs, we identify the conditions under which the merger is, respec-
tively, profitable and socially desirable. There exists an admissible
parameter range wherein the merger is socially convenient but not
profitable. In such a case, the policy maker may induce firms to merge
through subsidies financed via a lump sum tax.
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1 Introduction
The bearings of production technology on the profitability of horizontal merg-
ers in a Cournot oligopoly has attracted wide attention ever since Salant et
al. (1983). Under the assumption of constant average cost, they have shown
that, unless a vast majority of the firms in the industry merge, the merger
itself is not profitable, and therefore the scope for antitrust action is limited.
This seminal contribution has generated a stream of literature investigating
other cases, such as that of a quadratic cost function (Perry and Porter,
1985; McAfee and Williams, 1992).1 To the best of our knowledge, the only
contribution where the case of increasing returns (i.e., economies of scale) is
illustrated is Farrell and Shapiro (1990), where, however, it is assumed that
the amount of fixed costs retained by the firm resulting from the merger is
exactly equal to the sum of the pre-merger fixed costs of the participating
firms. The usual argument put forward to justify a merger is the increase
in productive eﬃciency generated by the merger itself (see, e.g., Farrell and
Shapiro, 2000). Therefore, an interesting perspective is that where such ef-
ficiency gain is the outcome of an adjustment in fixed costs via the merger.
This is precisely the view that we adopt in the present paper. We model a
situation where a synergy operates, in such a way that the overall fixed cost
associated with the merger is a fraction of the sum of the fixed costs borne ex
ante by the firms taking part into the merger. This setup allows us to draw
several conclusions. The first is that, if the fixed cost savings generated by
1Other routes taken by the literature include the analysis of horizontal mergers un-
der Bertrand competition (Davidson and Deneckere, 1985) or non-linear market demand
functions (Hennessy, 2000), inter alia.
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the merger are large enough, then the merger becomes profitable irrespective
of the number of firms involved. Likewise, there exists a critical threshold of
such eﬃciency gain above which the merger is socially desirable. The ranking
of the two thresholds depend on the number of firms in the industry before
the merger takes place. If the size of the merger (that is, the number of firms
involved in it) is small enough, then we observe the counterintuitive and, thus
far, neglected situation where the merger is socially convenient while being
not profitable. If this is the case, then the policy maker may induce firms
to merge by subsidising them (for instance, by using funds raised through
taxes) provided that the representative shareholder is suﬃciently atomistic
to ensure that future dividends compensate current taxation.
2 The model
We examine a Cournot oligopoly where, ex ante, n firms sell a homogeneous
good whose demand function is p = a−
Pn
i=1 qi. Each firm uses a technology
characterised by increasing returns to scale, summarised by the cost function
Ci = cqi + F, where c > 0 is the marginal cost and F > 0 is a fixed cost.
Firms compete simultaneously. Therefore, individual outputs and profits
at the symmetric Nash equilibrium are:
q∗ (n) =
a− c
n+ 1
; π∗ (n) =
(a− c)2
(n+ 1)2
− F (1)
and the corresponding consumer surplus is:
CS∗ (n) =
[nq∗ (n)]2
2
=
n2 (a− c)2
2 (n+ 1)2
. (2)
Hence, social welfare is SW ∗ (n) = nπ∗ (n) + CS∗ (n) .
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Now consider the situation where m ∈ [2, n− 1] firms evaluate the per-
spective of merging horizontally. We suppose that the merger gives rise to a
restructuration of production plants within the resulting firm; in particular,
we assume that the amount of fixed cost be equal to bF ≡ (1 + b)F, with
b ∈ [0,m− 1] . Therefore, for all b < m − 1, the usual argument whereby a
merger is justified on eﬃciency grounds applies in the form of a reduction of
the total amount of fixed cost borne by society.
As a consequence of the merger, outputs, profits and consumer surplus
modify as follows:
q∗ (n−m+ 1) = a− c
n−m+ 2 ;
bπ∗ (n−m+ 1) = (a− c)2
(n−m+ 2)2
− (1 + b)F
π∗ (n−m+ 1) = (a− c)
2
(n−m+ 2)2
− F (3)
CS∗ (n−m+ 1) = (n−m+ 1)
2 (a− c)2
2 (n−m+ 2)2
where bπ∗ (n−m+ 1) is the profit of the firm resulting from the merger while
π∗ (n−m+ 1) is the profit accruing to each of the n − m firms that have
remained independent. The associated social welfare is
SW ∗ (n−m+ 1) = bπ∗ (n−m+ 1)+(n−m)π∗ (n−m+ 1)+CS∗ (n−m+ 1) .
(4)
Comparing ex ante and ex post profits and welfare, we may prove the
following:
Proposition 1 For all admissible levels of {b, n,m} , there exist the thresh-
old values of fixed costs Fπ and FSW above which the merger involving m
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firms is, respectively, privately and socially desirable. If n = 3 and m = 2,
then Fπ < FSW . If instead n ≥ 4, then (i) Fπ > FSW if m is suﬃciently
small, and (ii) Fπ < FSW if m is suﬃciently large.
Proof. The private (profit) incentive to carry out the merger requires:
bπ∗ (n−m+ 1)
m
> π∗ (n)⇔ (5)
F > Fπ ≡
m (a− c)2
m− 1− b
∙
1
(n+ 1)2
− 1
m (n−m+ 2)2
¸
while the social incentive requires:
SW ∗ (n−m+ 1) > SW ∗ (n)⇔ (6)
F > FSW ≡
(a− c)2
2 (m− 1− b)
∙
1
(n−m+ 2)2
− 1
(n+ 1)2
¸
.
Comparing Fπ and FSW , we obtain Fπ = FSW at
m1 =
5
4
+ n− 1
4
√
24n+ 33;m2 =
5
4
+ n+
1
4
√
24n+ 33. (7)
Clearly, m2 > n and can be disregarded; m1 is always smaller than n, but
m1 ≥ 2 if and only if n ≥ 4. If n = 3, we have a special case wherem1 = 1.688.
Therefore, we have two cases:
(i) for n = 3 and m = 2
Fπ =
(a− c)2
72 (1− b) < FSW =
7 (a− c)2
288 (1− b); (8)
(ii) for all n ≥ 4,
Fπ > FSW for all m ∈ [2,m1) ;
Fπ < FSW for all m ∈ (m1, n− 1] .
(9)
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This concludes the proof.
Now take the special case where n = 3 and m = 2. Here, given that the a
priori degree of concentration of the industry is very high, the critical thresh-
old for F above which the antitrust agency permits the merger is necessarily
higher than that above which firms find it profitable.
The perspective changes significantly for all n ≥ 4. Provided that, as n
increases, the market becomes progressively more competitive, then m1 be-
comes relevant and determines the presence of an interval where relatively
small mergers are socially desirable. Note that m1 is monotonically increas-
ing in n. To this regard, it is worth stressing that, for all F ∈ (FSW , Fπ) ,
any merger involving m ∈ [2,m1) is socially convenient while it is not pri-
vately so. That is, we have the seemingly counterintuitive result whereby
the antitrust agency would like the m firms to merge, whereas they prefer
to remain independent. To the best of our knowledge, this possibility has
been overlooked so far in the existing literature. The reason of this result is
that m is small. This entails two related consequences: the first is that, for
any given b, the reduction in fixed costs enjoyed by the firms involved in the
merger is limited; the second is that the reduction in the overall number of
firms in the industry after the merger has taken place is also limited. The
first fact makes the merger unattractive to firms, while the second makes it
appealing for the regulator. When this is the case, the policy maker may
design an income transfer from consumers to the merging firms by means of
a lump sum tax that becomes a subsidy to firms, so as to make the merger
attractive to them. The total subsidy amounts toµ
π∗ (n)− bπ∗ (n−m+ 1)
m
+ ε
¶
m (10)
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where ε is positive and arbitrarily small. This of course has no redistributive
eﬀects provided that all agents holds symmetric shares of the stock of those
firms that are to carry out the merger.
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